The Optimizely hack: malware on BBC, Zoom and Ledger sites swapped the crypto addresses you copied
On 16 November 2026 an attacker slipped code into Optimizely, a testing tool that big websites load on every page. Between 08:28 UTC, when the swapper was first seen on bbc.com, and a clean-up that evening, a script served to visitors of 178 organisations' sites replaced wallet addresses with the attacker's. From early afternoon it also skimmed cards, and it went after older iPhones too. The sites themselves were never hacked, which is exactly why it worked.
TL;DR
On 16 November 2026, malicious code inside Optimizely, a third-party script used by sites like Zoom, the BBC, CNN, HSBC and Ledger, swapped any crypto address you copied or saw for the attacker's. The swapper was first seen running at 08:28 UTC, and from 13:43 UTC the same script also skimmed card numbers typed into site forms. It also targeted older iPhones. It was almost entirely cleaned up by about 22:00 UTC. If you sent crypto that day, compare the address in your wallet history with the one you meant to pay, and update your iPhone to iOS 18.7.3 or 26.3 or later. You did not visit a fake site, so nothing about the address bar would have warned you.
How a testing tool ended up stealing crypto
On the evening of 16 November, security researcher Scott Helme drew attention to it on X, posting that his team was "tracking a breach of a 3rd-party JS host impacting hundreds of high value websites."
We are tracking a breach of a 3rd-party JS host impacting hundreds of high value websites. This is staggering.
- Scott Helme (@Scott_Helme) November 16, 2026
The host was Optimizely. Companies use its Optimizely Web product to run A/B tests, so each customer's site loads a small JavaScript file, called a snippet, from Optimizely's servers on every page. Each snippet has a field called Project JavaScript where the customer can add their own code, and that code runs for every visitor.
According to Report URI's write-up, the attacker wrote code into that field in customer after customer, in most snippets just a few lines. The rest of each snippet was untouched. The file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com, with Optimizely's own certificate, from an address every affected site already trusted. Those few lines loaded a second script, track.js, from a domain the attacker had registered that morning: 1688360.cc.
Report URI checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found 188 of them, belonging to 178 organisations, carrying the code. The names are the point. The list includes Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Peacock and Ledger, the hardware wallet maker. Hudson Rock's research team directly recovered eight poisoned Optimizely files, and Amirul Cyber, which named the campaign OPTIMJACK, captured the payload loading on sites including CNN and Zoom through their Optimizely files.
How the attacker got write access to so many unrelated customer accounts is not known. Report URI says it could be a compromised Optimizely system, a credential with access across customers, or something else, and that Optimizely had not responded by the time it published. Optimizely did confirm a separate data breach after a voice phishing attack in February 2026, but none of the researchers cited here has linked that to this incident, and neither do we.
The day, hour by hour
The timeline below is from Report URI's investigation. All times are UTC on 16 November 2026 unless marked.
- 17 September: webshell[.]lol, the same actor's earlier injector, first appears on Turkish sites through an SEO "backlink panel" script.
- 9 November: 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, the first iPhone exploit router, is registered.
- 04:21: the first Optimizely injection is seen, in the BBC's snippet, loading webshell[.]lol.
- 05:23: 1688360[.]cc is registered.
- 08:28:
track.js, the crypto address swapper, is first seen running on bbc.com. - 13:03: the attacker moves stolen crypto out to exchanges.
- 13:43: a card skimmer is added to the same script.
- 16:38 to 17:57: a second iPhone router, eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, is registered and wired in.
- 19:24 to 19:59: Report URI's sweep finds 186 of 1,611 snippets infected.
- About 20:40 to 21:10: mass clean-up. Ledger is cleaned at 20:41 and the BBC at 21:07.
- 21:52: one snippet out of 188 is still infected.
The script was rebuilt 26 times during the day. Report URI notes that the attacker kept adding features and wallets, and never removed a wallet.
What the script did to visitors
Every visitor got the same script, and every part of it was switched on at once. What happened to you depended on your device and what you did on the page.
It swapped wallet addresses, everywhere it could reach
The script looked for real wallet addresses for Bitcoin, Ethereum and other EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin. It checked their checksums, so it only touched valid ones, and replaced each with an attacker address of the same type. It did this in the page text, in form fields, in links, in your clipboard when you copied, and in requests the page sent. It kept re-scanning as the page changed. Report URI's summary is blunt: copy an address from an affected page, or from anywhere else while that tab is open, and you may paste the attacker's.
That last part is the one to take seriously. You did not have to be reading about crypto on bbc.com. An address you copied from your exchange and then pasted into an affected page, or that the page read from your clipboard while you were on it, could be replaced.
It skimmed cards typed into the site's own forms
From 13:43 UTC the script watched for a card number, expiry date and security code being submitted, and sent all three to the attacker. Cards entered in a payment provider's own embedded frame, such as Stripe or Adyen, were out of its reach. Cards typed into a site's own form fields were not.
It took cookies and a screenshot
When it swapped an address next to wallet or payment wording, it also sent the page address, any cookies not marked HttpOnly, the original address it replaced and a screenshot of the page.
It tried to break into older iPhones
On iPhones and iPads it loaded exploit kits known as Coruna and DarkSword from the .icu hosts, matched to the iOS version. Report URI says the kit's own comments list iOS 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, as patched, and that on iOS 18.6 or earlier the page reloaded every 60 seconds to retry, which is a visible symptom.
The money, and the addresses to check against
By 19:25 UTC the attacker's wallets had received about $7,040, all within roughly nine hours, according to Report URI, which verified the transactions on chain. Scott Helme put it the same way on X: "about $7k received across BTC, LTC, TRON and ETH." That figure only covers crypto. Report URI could not see how many cards or cookies reached the attacker's server.
These are the replacement addresses published by both Report URI and Amirul Cyber. If you sent crypto on 16 November, look up the transaction in your wallet or a block explorer and compare the destination with this list:
- BTC:
19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW - ETH and EVM chains:
0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e - TRON:
THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa - Solana:
FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n - TON:
UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p - Litecoin:
ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5 - Bitcoin Cash:
qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58 - Dogecoin:
DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5
Never send anything to these addresses, and do not copy them anywhere except into a search box to compare.
What a link scanner could and could not see
Here is the uncomfortable part for anyone who sells browser protection, us included. Almost every safety habit people are taught is about the address bar: is this the real domain, is it a lookalike, is it new. Every one of those checks passed on 16 November. You were on bbc.com, or zoom.us, or ledger.com. The domain was real, years old and correct. The code that robbed you was planted inside a file served from cdn.optimizely.com, a real company's real server with a valid certificate, and that file then pulled in the stealer from the attacker's own domain.
The SafeBrowz browser extension checks the address of each page you open against Google Safe Browsing, other threat feeds and our block list. It does not inspect or block third-party scripts that a legitimate page loads from other servers, and its wallet-address check only looks at wallet signing prompts, against a list that did not include these addresses. So on an affected site it would have shown that site as safe, because the site was the real one. We would rather say that plainly than let anyone believe otherwise.
Security researchers call it a watering-hole attack when someone poisons a site its victims already trust. This one reached 178 organisations' visitors at once by poisoning a single supplier they all shared.
What we did do: on 16 November, after reading the Report URI indicators, we added all 12 attacker domains to our block list, including subdomains. A link that sends you straight to any of them, the main server, the .icu exploit routers, linkforge[.]cc or webshell[.]lol, now comes back as danger in the extension, the Android app, the web checker and our detection API. That matters because the same actor has reused its infrastructure: webshell[.]lol first appeared in September and was loaded again from the BBC's snippet on 16 November, and Report URI found that the TRON wallet had been in use since March 2026. Detection signatures are derived from threat-intelligence research and our internal brand database, not from user browsing data. SafeBrowz does not store per-user browsing history.
The real defence against this kind of attack sits on the website's side, not the visitor's. Report URI's crawl of affected organisations' own sites found that 24 of those organisations blocked the payload with a strict Content Security Policy, a header that tells the browser which servers a page may load scripts from and send data to. Another 17 let the script run but stopped it sending stolen data out, which still left the address swapping working because that happens inside the page. On the visitor's side, what protects your crypto is the habit below.
A 30-second habit that beats a clipper
A clipper only wins if you trust the address it put in front of you. These checks do not depend on knowing whether a site was compromised:
- Confirm the address on a second screen. On a hardware wallet, read the full address on the device's own screen before you approve, and compare it with the address the recipient gave you. The device shows exactly what it was handed, so if a script swapped the address before the transaction was built, that comparison will reveal it.
- Compare the whole address. The attacker addresses published for this clipper are not lookalikes, so a quick glance at the ends would catch them, but address-poisoning scams use lookalikes that match at both ends. Read a chunk from the middle as well, and the habit covers both.
- Get the address from the source, not a web page. Use the receive screen in the recipient's wallet app, or have them send it through a channel you already use with them.
- For large amounts, test first and wait for a reply. A small test only helps if the recipient confirms they received it. If it went to a swapped address, the test is lost too, but the rest is not.
- Pay attention to a page that keeps reloading on your iPhone. In this campaign that was the sign of the exploit retrying. Update iOS rather than ignoring it.
Our guide to crypto address poisoning covers the lookalike-address trick that targets the same habit from a different direction, and our explainer on pastejacking covers older copy-and-paste tricks that abuse the clipboard in a similar way.
If you used an affected site on 16 November
- Check every crypto transfer you made that day. Compare the destination with the address you intended and with the attacker list above. Crypto sent to the wrong address cannot be pulled back, but report it anyway, see below.
- Update your iPhone or iPad to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later, which is Report URI's advice.
- Watch your card statements if you typed a card into an affected site's own form that day. If you are unsure, ask your card issuer to replace the card. It costs you a few days, not your money.
- Sign out and back in on accounts you used on those sites that day, as a precaution, since cookies may have been sent along with the screenshots. The fix for stolen session cookies is on the site's side, and Report URI's advice to affected sites is to rotate them.
- Report theft. In the US, report crypto or card fraud at ic3.gov, and tell the exchange or wallet provider you sent from. Our recovery guide sets out what to do in what order, and warns about the "recovery" scammers who target people right after a loss.
Report URI's article has the full list of affected organisations by sector, so you can check the sites you used that day. If you run a site with Optimizely Web, its write-up also lists exactly what to look for in your Project JavaScript.
Check a domain from this campaign
Seen one of these hosts in a link, a security report or your own site's logs? Paste it here. Tap the dotted red domain link in the first section to try it, it should come back as danger.
Frequently asked questions
Was I affected if I visited the BBC, Zoom or CNN on 16 November 2026?
Possibly. Malicious code was served through Optimizely to visitors of 178 organisations, including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, HSBC and Ledger, from early on 16 November until a clean-up that started at about 20:40 UTC and was almost complete by about 22:00 UTC. The script swapped crypto addresses, skimmed cards typed into a site's own forms and targeted older iPhones. If you did not send crypto that day or type a card into one of those sites' own forms, the main things to do are to update your iPhone or iPad and, as a precaution, sign out and back in on accounts you used there.
Which websites were infected by the Optimizely malware?
Report URI found the code in 188 Optimizely snippets belonging to 178 organisations. Named examples include Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Peacock and Ledger. Report URI's write-up lists every organisation it confirmed, grouped by sector, and says the real number is likely higher.
How do I know if my crypto went to the attacker?
Open the transaction in your wallet history or a block explorer and compare the destination with the address you meant to pay. The attacker's replacement addresses were published by Report URI and Amirul Cyber, for example 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW for Bitcoin and 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e for Ethereum and EVM chains. If it matches, report it to ic3.gov in the US and to the exchange or wallet you sent from.
Are those websites safe to use now?
Report URI found the code in only 1 of the 188 snippets at 21:52 UTC on 16 November, and Scott Helme said at 22:49 UTC that the clean-up seemed to be done. The sites' own domains were never fake, so the risk was the injected script, not the sites. Keep your iPhone updated and keep confirming crypto addresses on a second screen, since the same kind of attack can happen through any third-party script.
Could a browser extension have blocked this attack?
A link checker that looks at the address of the page you open would have seen the real site and called it safe, and SafeBrowz would have done the same, because it checks the address of the page itself, and the malicious code arrived inside Optimizely's genuine file. What it does catch is a link straight to the attacker's own domains: SafeBrowz added all 12 of them to its block list on 16 November. The defence that worked on the website side was a strict Content Security Policy, which blocked the payload at 24 of the affected organisations whose sites Report URI checked.